Research
Quantum networking, built to feed the plane.
The orchestration plane treats every kind of key and signature material as an interchangeable source. Our research arm builds the quantum ones, and each joins the plane as its hardware becomes deployable.
Programs
What we’re building beneath the plane.
Quantum key distribution
A full entanglement-based engine: BBM92, reconciliation, privacy amplification, a finite-key security bound, and key delivery over ETSI 014. It converts roughly 10% of the source's raw rate into secret key, about 200 Kbps from a 2 Mbps source, so the key rate grows with how hard the source is driven.
FPGA-accelerated error correction
LDPC reconciliation running on FPGA, proven end to end on the bench. Moving the heaviest step into hardware lifts the engine past the limit of a single CPU core.
Quantum entropy
Certifiable randomness for seeding HSMs: an entropy-source abstraction with SP 800-90B continuous health tests, a hardware driver and an entropy pool.
Quantum digital signatures
Signing and verification over ML-DSA today, and a design for quantum digital signatures, which is open ground: no standard and no commercial product exist yet.
Simulation
A BBM92 simulator cross-validated against published field data without parameter fitting. It lets us scope a new source before we touch its hardware.
The quantum link
Two sites, one quantum link, the same gateways.
Each site runs a Dainamiq key-management entity beside its gateway. The two share key over the quantum link, and each gateway draws its keys over ETSI 014, the standard interface the major firewalls already embed. Same tunnel, same encryption; only where the keys come from changes.
Where the gear differs
Fortinet keys over its own notify
FortiOS negotiates with a proprietary USE_QKD notify rather than RFC 8784's USE_PPK (16435), so a FortiGate shares quantum keys over IPsec only with another FortiGate. It still speaks ETSI 014 to the KME.
Cisco keys over SKIP
IOS-XE and IOS-XR use Cisco's proprietary SKIP protocol. A Cisco integration means the KME exposes a SKIP server: separate engineering.
MACsec and optical take engineering
On Ciena, Nokia, ADVA and Thales/Senetas gear the ETSI 014 client lives in the vendor's key-management server, not the encryptor, and IEEE 802.1X MKA has no field to carry the key_ID between peers. Each is a solutions-engineering engagement.
From research to the plane
A new source is a policy change, not a new platform.
Every source plugs into the same hardware abstraction, the same delivery API and the same evidence record. When one is ready, an institution enables it in policy for the links that warrant it, and its keys carry the same provenance as everything else in the plane.
Working on quantum networking hardware? info@dainamiq.com